Karl Menninger:" "Whatever Became of 'Inappropriate?"' We hasten to make our contribution before that happens.
First, we venture a survey of the more common modem uses of the word; then an extended discussion of a representative legal context-sexual harassment; then a theory of where this modem usage plugs into moral reasoning (ethics); and, to conclude, a suggestion on how to interpret "appropriate" when we are able to take it seriously in ethics and in jurisprudence.
I. FouR WAYS "APPROPRIATE" IS USED THBESE DAYS
A. "Appropriate" Meaning "Distinctive"
The second edition of the Oxford English Dictionary gives five traditional meanings for the adjective "appropriate." The second, third, and fourth are " [b] elonging to oneself," "[a]ssigned to a particular person," and " [a] ttached or belonging as an attribute [or] quality." ' In this sense, a member of a women's club in Danville, Virginia-an old and elite organization-complained that, "People sometimes suggest inappropriate speakers." 13 The Society of Jesus, addressing their new agenda for "collaboration with the laity in mission,' encourages "participative decision-making where it is appropriate," that is, when the decision at hand is not one reserved to itself by the unmarried male clergy, who are, by decree, distinctive when it comes to ecclesiastical policymaking.Y 4 And an expert on dogs faced up to the charge that "Benji... barks inappropriately" by explaining that "[h]e's barking because he's trying to tell you something. You just don't know what it is."'" Experts on automobiles understand that cars, like dogs, are not distinctively rude, because they are not capable of being rude.1 6 If a car's 11. See KARL MENNINGER, WHATEVER BECAME OF SiN? (1973) . 12. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 3, at 586-87. Louis Auchincloss's Fellow Passengers illustrates this meaning in describing Clement Ludlow, Wall Street estatetax lawyer: "His gentleness, equanimity, and mild formal good manners seemed appropriate to his slight, straight build and to the air of shadowy grayness on his grave, narrow, but still handsome face." Louis AuciNCLoss, FELLOW PASSENGERS 148 (1989 horn honks "inappropriately," it is because "the contacts in your [car's] steering column are probably all worn out."' 7 Anne Tyler, who never descends to the hackneyed unintentionally, has a scene in her novel Ladder of Years, in which Delia, the protagonist, a self-effacing woman from Maryland, is talked into pretending that she is the estranged wife of a man Delia encounters in a supermarket; the man has seen that his girlfriend is coming up the aisle, and he wants to make her jealous. When the charade is over, the man thanks Delia, and Delia says, "It was nothing. I just wish there'd been, oh, somebody really appropriate. .... you know, as glamorous as your wife.' 8 When it is behavior that is appropriate-as-distinctive, the adjective's meaning tends to shade into moral judgment. The Jesuit moral theologian Thomas L. Schubeck, in writing about liberation theology, is thus careful not to accuse Father Gustavo Gutierrez of misusing the Bible; Gutierrez, Father Schubeck says, "does not demand from the Bible answers to inappropriate questions, such as biblical guidelines for governing guerrilla warfare."' 9 It is not that the Bible-a distinctive source-lacks content that would speak to the conduct of warfare, but, we infer, that an attempt to use that content to justify guerrilla warfare would be a misuse-an immoral use, even-of the distinctive character of scripture.
Medicine abounds with instances of usage that straddle the appropriate-as-distinctive category and the appropriate-as-moral category. For example, the mother of a two-year-old wrote to Dr. Allan Bruckheim, author of a "Family Doctor" newspaper column, complaining about an emergency-room physician who had been rude to her when she reported that her child had "stuffed a small calculator battery up his nose."'" Dr. Bruckheim ruled that "the 17. Id.
ANNE TYLER, LADDER OF YEARs 13-14 (1995).

THOMAS L. SCHUBECK, SJ., LIBERATION ETHics 169 (1993).
20. The moral justification of violence to bring about liberation is a tender question in liberation theology. See id. at 68-75 (evaluating moral theologian Juan Luis Segundo's contention that not all decisions to use violence are morally wrong). Tom Brokaw was, in this straddling way, congratulated by a fellow journalist for behaving well when he represented the United States in a 1987 conversation with Mikhail Gorbachev: "Brokaw's behavior was . . . for the occasion quite appropriate. It was a welcome relief from those television news performers who through hyperconfidence or gall treat everyone they face as their intellectual equals (or perhaps inferiors)." Thomas Griffith, High Moments in a Low Key, TIME, Dec. 14, 1987, at 68.
Dr. Allan Bruckheim, Prevention is the Best Cure for Painful Hangnails, CHL
concern you sensed in the physician was appropriate," because the situation was both common and serious.' He did seem, though, to miss the point of the woman's question. She had written that the physician "made a bigger thing gut of this than necessary....
[He really made me feel bad." ' The issue, she argued, was a moral issue; it is immoral to make people feel bad over trifles. Other, less careful authors use "appropriate" to describe moral issues in the lifesupport/euthanasia context. Walter Farquharson, the former moderator of the United Church of Canada, said: "We believe that it is appropriate to withdraw medical treatments that are not benefiting the patient and that are prolonging suffering and dying when the competent patient decides and when... firm evidence of disease irreversibility exists.... We do not believe, however, that legalization of assisted suicide is justified." Harms F. Skoutajan, Post-sacred Society, 112 CHRISTIAN CENTURY 948, 950 (1995). Francine Arsenault, Chairperson of the Council of Canadians with Disabilities, commented after a court's ruling on a father's assistance in his daughter's suicide that "[w]e cannot support [his] claim that he had the legal right to decided [sic] to commit suicide for his daughter. The verdict of the jury and sentence of the court are just and appropriate. To do otherwise is to say that the life of a person with a disability is not equal to that of someone non-disabled." Id. It is certainly important to distinguish between withholding medical procedures and physician-assisted suicide. But announcing that one behavior or the other is "appropriate" does not do that job. In contrast to the more careful medical use of the A-word, these examples showcase moralists who cannot explain their moral judgments.
When medical professionals deal with one another, they use "appropriate" as in etiquette, but in doing so they also invoke medicine's take on professionalism. For example: "Inappropriate and Appropriate Selection of 'Peers' in Grant Review." 272 JAMA 114 (1994). Another article discusses the "inappropriate" use of prescription drugs by the B. "Appropriate" Meaning "Proper" "Appropriate" is often used to express amateur judgments in etiquette. It is rarely used by the experts, and almost never by Miss Manners herself. She doesn't need it, for example, when she describes the relevant distinction with regard to changing American mores on smoking: "When smoking habits were considered a matter of etiquette, smokers (known then as 'gentlemen') were easily kept from annoying nonsmokers (known as 'ladies'). Now that it is treated as a moral problem, the smokers and nonsmokers are using not just smoke but emotional fire to kill one another.
S
Lawrence Block presents a disturbing case. He wins, and deserves to win, prizes for his Matthew Scudder crime novels, but he has lately drifted into hackneyed use of the A-word. He uses it five times in A Long Line of Dead Men. In three instances he uses it to mean "proper," but his use is vague and without adequate context. Block's story involves an odd men's club which meets once a year to see which of them have died. Soon after the club's founding (established to replace a similar club which decined as no one was left to come to the meetings), a question arises about whether members should attend the funerals of recently-dead members. Some attend, some don't. One member "wasn't coming" to the funeral of the first member to die, another member explains. "[Hie didn't think it was appropriate. ' ' 6 A majority of members of the club agrees not to provide "a case of good Bordeaux for the last man to drink. We decided whoever was left would be too old to enjoy it. Besides, it seemed inappropriate, even frivolous." ' Both of these instances are more elderly, allegedly causing $20 billion worth of otherwise unnecessary hospitalizations each year. Here, "inappropriate" means that the prescribing physician committed an error. See Harry Rosenthal, Drug Interactions Cause Big Problems, SOUTH BEND TRi., Sept. 17, 1995, at F9 ("The medical community belatedly is emphasizing the need to increase physicians' knowledge of geriatrics and elderly clinical pharmacology.").
JUDiTH MARTIN, COMMON COURTESY: IN WmIcH Miss MANNERS SOLVES THE
PROBLEM THAT BAFFLED MR. JEFFERSON 26 (1985) . Criticisms of humor with the levity of a "lead balloon" are probably the purest form of amateur etiquette judgment. Consider the newspaper column a fond adult daughter wrote for her father on Father's Day: "His raucous jokes-often wholly inappropriate-are the sign of a man who refuses to stand on ceremony. sensitive reactions than that of a chauffeur for one of the members, who neglects to thank Matt Scudder for giving him a message: "He shot me a guarded look; he was glad to have the information but didn't think it was appropriate for me to talk to him." ' Some mystery writers do better. Carl Hiaasen, as nearly as we can find, uses the A-word only once in Double Whammy, and we are reluctant to fault him for it: "[Decker, the detective] tried to remember the polite thing to say when a beautiful stranger struck up a conversation about oral sex. None of the obvious replies seemed appropriate for a funeral.
29
The differences between Block and Hiaasen here are twofold: not only does Hiassen 1) explain Decker's judgment about what is proper, but he 2) does so by providing a context for his use of the A-word. Block's "Dead Man's Club" is bizarre-its moral purposes are obscure; its social purposes macabre. For a member of the club to say it is not "appropriate" for survivor members to attend the funeral of one who dies, nor for the club to keep wine for the last to die, doesn't tell the reader anything at all. Why not attend the funeral or provide the case of wine? 3 " It is impossible to tell what the purposes are, social or moral, without a context. Context, as we hope to show, 31 makes all the difference.
What is proper is rarely precisely what is moral. Thus the mother of a nursing student wrote to Ann Landers, worried about the fact that a guidance counselor at the nursing school was carrying on with one of the instructors. That may have been something law, morals, or etiquette should take account of, but that was not the subject of "Missouri Mother's" question: "I am tempted to inform the authorities... but I don't want to act inappropriately and perhaps get my daughter in trouble." 32 This example is unusual in the clarity with which it attempts to show a difference between the purely proper-the stuff of mere etiquette-and propermeaning-moral. Missouri Mother's question has to do with propriety; she is simply asking how to deal with physicians and their cohorts. She does not doubt her own moral judgment. An example is Miss Manners' judgment regarding whether it is a violation of sound etiquette to throw food at sporting events? 7 First she attends to the argument her correspondent invited, about propriety: "The respectable argument is that this is a tradition which is part of a community ritual and that it is within the realm of acceptable behavior for the situation." 3 We classify that as a communal argument about propriety, invoking context as a method of explanation. If Miss Manners' sardonic tone implies a moral judgment, it is muted if not hidden. Not for long, however. "But," she then says, "not every tradition, however entrenched, is attractive. Some should be closed down immediately. Miss Manners could tell you of ancient wedding traditions that would make your hair stand on end." 39 Ritualistic practices may be (merely) improper; they may also be immoral. Miss Manners argues that throwing food is both improper and immoral. She notices that the tradition that appears to regard the unattractive behavior as proper may also harbor a deeper strain that rules it out: "Ancient cities that have traditions of carnivals and other whoopee occasions on which wild behavior is tolerated also have their deeply imbedded rules about what cannot be done, as uninformed tourists sometimes find out the hard way."1 4 0 Miss Manners also argues that throwing food is offensive and hence immoral, and backs the argument by referring to an advertent, communal, moral judgment: "Those who engage in the tradition of derisive shouting hear about it from both fellow fans and players when they overstep the acceptably insulting vocabulary. What is offensive to much of the participating community cannot be allowed." 4 ["Vol. 46:781 both more interesting for ethics than the three examples from Block's novel that we quoted above. 42 At the end of the story, after the killer has been attended to (but is not dead), Matt Scudder is asked to join the club (which, please recall, is a club that meets once a year to notice which of its members have died). "We have never taken in a new member before," the inviter says, "and we've never replaced members who have died, because that would be contrary to our whole design. But this would be a case of replacing a member who has not died, and it seems curiously appropriate." ' 43 It is appropriate-the proper thing to do, but also the right (and even creative) thing to do-because Matt has fingered the member who was the killer and is in line for recognition and reward. Context provides the ethical explanation. Matt declines the offer, though; perhaps the inviter could have used a more persuasive word.
The other example from Block, near the border between the proper and the moral, occurs earlier in the story when Matt is employed by the club to seek the killer. Members do not want the investigation revealed to the police, but private investigators who are not licensed (Matt Scudder's situation) are not able to withhold information from the police if the police ask for it. The solution is that one of the members, who is a lawyer, formally employs Matt, which extends the lawyer-client privilege to Matt as the lawyer's investigator. That satisfies the members. It does not make any difference to Matt. "If I should feel it was appropriate for me to withhold information from the police, I'd do it irrespective of the legal ramifications." ' There is no explanation and no context with which to determine whether, by "appropriate," Scud- 42 . See BLOCK, supra note 26, at 186, 284. 43. Id. at 284. 44. Id. at 186. One way to notice the use of the A-word to mean proper and to notice as well the communal character of such a judgment is to guess where a good writer might have used the A-word, but, being a good writer, did not. Miss Manners is so adept, in both respects, that her correspondents tend to write better English than, say, the correspondents of medical columnists or Ann Landers and Abigail Van Buren. One of Miss Manners' correspondents, for example, complained of a legislator who, during a public hearing, noticed the presence of the writer and other members of a delegation of women, and said, "'Mr. Chairman, we've got a lovely group of ladies here. We thank you for your presence. I have no questions.'" Judith Martin, Disarm Trivialization with Savvy Response, SouTH BEND TRI., Aug. 9, 1995, at D2. The writer asked if that behavior was "correct" and "proper." Id A lesser writer, subject to a lesser judge, might have accused the legislator of inappropriateness.
der meant "proper" or-more likely-"right." Matt, like Ms. Provenzano, is a person you have to know before you can understand what he is talking about.
C. "Appropriate" Meaning "Moral"
The Associated Press reported in April that a number of works of art were removed from an exhibit in Muskegon, Michigan, "after some people in the building where it was displayed complained it contained 'inappropriate' nudity." ' 45 With a sensitivity for elegance rare among modem American journalists, the anonymous reporter, using quotation marks, identified a moral agenda: "Bettye Clark Cannon, gallery namesake and its major underwriter, said she supported the action to remove [the works of art].. .. 'I have no problem with nudity, but this was lewd nudity, degrading women,' she said." 6 Senator Charles Robb, according to the press, "confessed to behavior 'not appropriate for a married man.' (He insists he always stopped short of intercourse.)" ' 47 Egalitarian progress among the young moved the editor of a high-school yearbook in Cromwell, Connecticut, to excise the "most-likely-to-succeed" superlative. "I don't think it fits," she said. "I don't think it's appropriate."
Sissela Bok, writer of books on the morals of lying and of secrecy-studies that manage to be both popular and learneduses the A-word with uncommon discretion, and uses it to express moral judgments on the ethics of lying to those not entitled to the [Vol. 46: 781 truth (an old category in the casuistry of truthfulness). Bok's ethical reasoning goes like this: 1) it is wrong to reveal secrets; 2) people who are trying not to reveal secrets may have to resort to telling lies; 3) their telling lies, in this circumstance, is not necessarily immoral, particularly when 4) the person seeking the information is not entitled to it, and 5) this person's requesting the information, when he is not entitled to it, may be wrong also. "The line between appropriate and inappropriate requests for information may shift from one society to another and be revised over time; but wherever the line is drawn, those charged with secrets have to decide how best to protect them." 49 This is a deft analysis of the example we two lawyers bring from our widely separated childhoods: "Is your mother at home?" "No," we answered, when she was at home, but, we were taught to think, "not to you.
D. "Appropriate" Meaning "Legal"
The use of "appropriate" as a substitute for "legal" is common in the law these days, in imprecise judgments about both legal procedure and legal substance. Thus one Indiana lawyer, representing a woman who filed a notice of claim for sexual harassment with the Attorney General of Indiana, said her client "wants ... to be compensated for her losses and for the damage she has incurred .... to make sure [the employer] deals with the problem appropriately."'" Doing so would resolve .not only the moral and mannerly difficulties, but also the legal dispute. In another and later newspaper story, the same lawyer, representing another complainant against the same employer, involving the same supervisor, was reported to have said, "The harassment was inappropriate" and that the supervisor "engaged in inappropriate comments ... of a sexual nature. 52 One wonders why the behavior the lawyer describes is not called, simply, "wrong"-or, as the context would seem to require, 49 "illegal." This opaque usage is hardly unusual among lawyers and judges as well as in "lay" discussion. When lawyers use the Aword to talk about law, they almost always could have used "legal" instead and with more clarity. The Indiana Court of Appeals, for example, in a burglary case in which the voluntariness of the defendant's confession was at issue, referred to "Officer House's inappropriate questioning techniques." 53 That court used the Aword in the same (substantive legal) way when it reviewed a criminal sentence imposed by a trial judge: "[T]he consecutive sentences were inappropriate in the present case." ' Hundreds of law journal articles use the A-word in the titles; such titles, like newspaper and magazine headlines, tend to be more hackneyed than what is in the articles. 5 A lawyer for Bernard Nussbaum, defending Mr. Nussbaum's conduct as the lawyer for President and Mrs. Clinton, after the death in the White House of Vincent Foster, said: "Mr. Nussbaum's testimony will make it clear that he acted in a perfectly appropriate way." 56 That is, apparently, in a legal way, in the way prescribed by what has come to be called "the law on lawyers.2M The A-word, used to express a legal judgment regarding a lawyer's behavior (a legal judgment that is for some reason called ethical) has become familiar in writing in that expanding, post-Watergate field; one writer shows both sides of the word choice we are talking about here when he equates "appropriate standards" with rejecting "a principal-agent/hired gun model of lawyering. ' An opinion of the American Bar Association's ethics committee on contingent fees, which used the A-word throughout, strove to describe a fee that "is appropriate in the circumstances and reasonable in amount. '59 This was a reference to general rules on fees charged by lawyers, which require that such fees be "reasonable," and a vacuous way to suggest other criteria; sometimes the A-word was used to say that contingent fees are reasonable, and sometimes it was used to refer to fees that are reasonable without considering whether they are contingent. In another opinion, in 1993, the same ABA committee addressed settlement conferences that are presided over by judges. May such a judge legally (or "ethically") ask one of the lawyers about settlement authority given in confidence to the lawyer by the lawyer's client? The committee said no: "It is not appropriate for the judge to compel lawyers to make confidential admissions which may be against their clients' interests." ' The A-word may arise more often, as in these committee opinion instances, when the context is "legal ethics" (that is, the law on lawyers) than when the context is another kind of law. If that is the case, the tendency may signal a thoughtful choice of this word, rather than older "legal ethics" words such as "wrong," "bad," "immoral," "unprofessional," "unethical," or "illegal." And if that is so, this Essay may have happened on to something interesting: that deliberate use of the A-word is indicative of a reliance by "the law on lawyers" on a cultural ethic of individualism and 
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59. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 389 (1994) (discussing contingent fees). A class-action consumer lawyer in Houston, for instance, asked for fees amounting to two-thirds of the damages awarded. An alert reporter interviewed other lawyers, one of whom ruled the request "inappropriate," without explaining why. Others who responded to the reporter's question gave no more context but used moral words which, perhaps, carry a context of their own. One called the fee "the grossest sort of overreaching"; another "way too big"; and a third "almost scandalous. autonomous moral agency. Otherwise, the preceding legal examples make lawyers' and judges' use of the A-word appear empty. But when, in legal literature, the word is used as a label and placed in context, or when it is used as a bridge to connect moral and legal reasoning, it seems to serve an intelligible purpose-or at least it, like chicken soup when you have a cold, seems not to do any harm. There are, we think, three categories of coherent use of the A-word in the law:
1. The A-word as a Label. Judicial opinions and academic discussions on attorneys' fees are an example. Here the legal writer uses "appropriate," often in a policy-based analysis, to signal rather than to explain (since the word does not by itself explain anything). Thus, in discussing whether plaintiffs who prevail under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) should receive attorneys' fees, as an analogy to fees awarded in civil-rights litigation, an academic author said the analogy is "appropriate" for fees for defendants, but "inappropriate" for fees for plaintiffs, and then provided analysis based partly on the notion of private attorneys general and partly on the policy of discouraging frivolous lawsuits. 6 ' This jurisprudential use of the word is not utterly awful because it is connected to a context-so that "fees are appropriate," for example, is not quite a statement ex cathedra. It adds little or nothing to the quality of the argument, but it gives the author a way to get started or to stop or both-one thinks of Christopher Robin's friend, who said, "[Either that is so] or my name's not Winnie-the-Pooh . . . 
The A-word as a Bridge Between the Legal and the Moral.
Uses of the A-word in cases where the law being analyzed rests on moral judgment are more defensible than uses of it merely as a label or an argument-stopper, perhaps because in those cases "appropriate" serves as a bridge between legal and moral analysis. An example can be found in the literature on whether it is defensible for a tax lawyer to advise her client to exploit the "audit lottery" and take a chance with fatuous or dishonest claims 3. The A-word in Statutes. Judges and lawyers who have to cope with the A-word in a statute are in a third situation. They attempt to provide a coherent meaning for the A-word because the nature of statutory interpretation requires it. In the fees context, for example, the Clean Air Act provides that "[t]he court... may award costs of litigation (including reasonable attorney and expert witness fees) to any party, whenever the court determines such award is appropriate." ' Congress may as well have put a period after "party." In an attempt at clarification, the Supreme Court did not offer a global definition of the word that Congress (no doubt purposefully) did not define, but it did say such things as: "[A]bsent some degree of success on the merits by the claimant, it is not 'appropriate' for a federal court to award attorney's fees .... " An academic commentator had to provide the policy considerations.' 63. See, eg., Grauer, supra note 58, at 357--64 (arguing that it is inappropriate to use the litigation standard of zealous advocacy for the attorney's role as tax advisor). ., 1967) , provides, "the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party." The former document consulted the latter, but neither set of drafters explained the former's use of the A-word to guide international jurists. "Necessary" is probably more useful than "appropriate." We are indebted to Professor Dinah Shelton for pointing us to this interesting difference.
II. A CLOSER LOOK AT A LEGAL CONTEXT:
SEXUAL HARASSMENT
Careful use of the word "appropriate" is especially important in the law because people need to be able to predict the legal consequences of their behavior. An example that justifies somewhat extended analysis in this Essay arises in the developing law on sexual harassment.
In the landmark case Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,' the United States Supreme Court endeavored to clarify sexual discrimination jurisprudence, citing guidelines from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) that specified that sexual harassment is a form of sexual discrimination prohibited by Title VI.'69 The court noted that the guidelines defined sexual harassment by describing the kinds of conduct in the workplace that may be actionable under Title VII. Unlawful actions under the guidelines included "(u)nwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature." 7 0 Following the EEOC's admirable example, the Court avoided using "inappropriate," and instead declared: "The gravamen of any sexual harassment claim is that the alleged sexual advances were 'unwelcome. "' 71 Despite the good example of the Meritor Court and the EEOC Guidelines, the Supreme Court blurred the line of demarcation for illegal conduct constituting sexual harassment in its 1993 decision Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.72 In Harris, the Court affirmed Meritor's standards, but, in an apparent attempt to clarify things, declared that the standard "takes a middle path between making actionable conduct that is merely offensive and requiring the conduct to cause a tangible psychological injury." 73 Harris also held that in order to be actionable as an "abusive work environment," conduct need not go so far as to "seriously affect [the [Vol. 46:781 plaintiff's] psychological well-being" or lead to actual injury. 7 4 In the wake of Harris, one commentator has observed, "It's clear that harassment law restricts speech. What's not clear is which kinds of speech the law prohibits, and which kinds can still legally be said." ' As a consequence of this imprecision, lesser courts have (predictably) fallen back on the A-word to describe conduct they mean to condemn. For example, in Oslin v. State, 76 former employees of a state treatment center sued the state under a number of theories, alleging damages arising from a supervisor's conduct. The judges in Minnesota noted that the supervisor engaged in "inappropriate behavior" when he beckoned one plaintiff, "grabbed her, touched the sides of her breasts, stated 'you are one hell of a woman,' and kissed her on the lips," ' to which she responded by pushing the supervisor away and stating that "this isn't right." 8 Another incident which the court counted as "inappropriate behavior" involved the supervisor grabbing the inside of the employee's leg, sliding his hand up her leg, and grasping her groin area." 9 The court further classified as "inappropriate" the supervisor's retaliation against another employee after she had filed a charge of sex discrimination!°A lthough it is clear that the judge in Oslin regarded all three incidents of behavior as "inappropriate," and, if true as alleged, illegal, this perhaps would not be the case were another judge presiding. For example, in Randi W. v. Livingston Union School District,l California judges extended the misuse of the A-word to describe sexual abuse in school. The case involved a victim's action against school authorities who recommended a former employee for a position at another school, despite their knowledge of the employee's propensity for molesting female students.' The employee at issue had allegedly "touched, molested, and engaged 74 A federal district court in Georgia distinguished a police lieutenant's "alleged sexual harassment" of three subordinates from "inappropriate behavior" toward another. In Bosley v. Kearney R-1 School District, 6 a federal district court in Missouri considered a harassment claim in a school setting where the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant and its agents "failed to fulfill their duty to stop inappropriate sexual harassment," '' which, again, appears to say that there are two types of sexual harassment-the appropriate kind and the inappropriate kind. In a federal court in California, a defendant's behavior, which included groping the plaintiffs' breasts and genital areas, commenting on their breast sizes, and exposing himself to them in public, was characterized as "sexual harassment and other forms of rude, obnoxious, and inappropriate behavior."" 8 We pause to wonder which of the defendant's activities were actionable sexual harassment and which were merely "inappropriate," meaning not actionable. Maybe these judges throw in the A-word as a way of saying they don't want to talk about it. 9 
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1995) (emphasis added).
89. Justice O'Connor demonstrated such avoidance when the Court considered whether police violated a suspect's Fifth Amendment rights when, prior to securing a Miranda waiver, they lied to the suspect's counsel regarding his client's interrogation and failed to alert the suspect about his lawyer's desire to be present at any interrogation. See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986). Reviewing the validity of the suspect's waiver, and eschewing reliance on the A-word, Judge Coffin of the First Circuit had characterized the interrogating officers' behavior as claimworthy, and found that "the failure to inform a suspect in custody that his attorney or an attorney retained for him was seeking to see him vitiated his waiver of his Fifth Amendment right to assistance of counsel at his questioning." Burbine v. Moran, 753 F.2d 178, 186 (1st Cir. 1985). Judge Coffin also observed:
Deliberate or reckless misleading of an attorney, who has a legitimate, professionally ethical interest in a suspect in custody and who expresses to the police [VCol. 46:781
We imagine a manager's (or lawyer's) attempt to formulate a workplace sexual harassment policy with decisions such as these to guide her. The "sample sexual harassment policy" suggested in a Practicing Law Institute Handbook encourages employers to begin with the following "statement of policy": "[Employer Inc.] is committed to maintaining a work environment that encourages and fosters appropriate conduct among employees and respect for individual values and sensibilities." 0 This, of course, settles very little; the problem is figuring out when rudeness, boorishness, and unkindness-all of which are inappropriate-as-improper-are also inappropriate-as-illegal. A journalist, looking at all of the preceding attempts to describe the law, took them to encourage moral behavior, depending on extra-legal sources to determine what morality requires: "If men and women are temporarily more cautious and self-conscious about what they may say and do, that may not be too high a price to pay for a new understanding of what is appropriate behavior, and what is not."'" She suggests that the inquiry for managers (or mere lawyers) is not really for an understanding of "appropriate behavior," but rather, for morally right, virtuous, and legal behavior. We think she's right, but we can imagine Ms. Provenzano saying, "Lots of luck."
The problem, we think, will be resolved when announcements of legal judgments by judges and scholars consistently provide a context for deciding what is "appropriate" (as in "fitting").
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Without context, the politically correct adjective "inappropriate" detracts from the severity and wrongness of the behavior at issue. The word does not point to moral judgment, as the journalist hoped; it points away from moral judgment. a desire to be present at any interrogation of the suspect, combined with a police failure to communicate that exchange to the suspect, is more than just one factor in the calculus of waiver. This combination of circumstances clearly vitiates any claim that a waiver of counsel was knowing and voluntary. 91. Nancy Gibbs, Relationship of the Year: Man and Woman, TIME, Jan. 6, 1992, at 47.
92.
See infra Section 11I.C.
Ill. THREE PERSPECriVEs
We propose three broad perspectives for somewhat more serious consideration of the use of the A-word in ethics and in jurisprudence. The first treats it as a linguistic phenomenon, similar to many other shifts in language, that might show how moral discourse deteriorated among the English-speaking peoples as their societies became more "pluralistic." The second considers uses of the word as a form of earnest ethical argument in which a serious claim of appropriateness (or a serious accusation of inappropriateness) means something. The third returns to the subject of sexual harassment law for an example of a proper use of "appropriate" in a legal context.
A. The Dynamics of Moral Words
1. Rational. The use of the word "rational," to begin with the first of a number of suggestive analogues, teems with history and complexity. 3 Its root meaning identifies a mode or product of thought; to say that a principle or proposition is "rational" is to say that one is prepared to give reasons for it, to attempt to persuade others that the principle or proposition makes sense.' The adjective has had this meaning since the Middle Ages. Often, in early usage, its meaning was anchored to broad theological reasoning. Chaucer talks about a "reasonable prayer." 95 Raymond Williams located a seventeenth century religious argument for "reasonable wage demands." 96 Sometimes the word derogatorily referred to carnal appetite, to "carnal reason"-medieval people being lusty thinkers, as we know from Chaucer and Boccaccio. 7 In these senses, from early usage, the appeal "developed a very early specialized sense of moderation or limitation, which says much about the understanding of the human condition within 
Id.
See id.
[Vol. 46:781 a medieval theological perspective."" As late as the seventeenth century, to call someone a "rationalist" was to accuse him, in his arrogant and ultimate dependence on "sensible evidence" and his disdain for scripture and the memory of the church, of being an atheist-and therefore of not being reasonable at all. 99 Whatever the soundness of either side of that meta-ethical argument, each was at least relatively clear, so that, even in that venue, "in the most bitter disputes, most parties ... claimed to have reason on their side."'0 Then, as a product of the Enlightenment, "rational" began to claim a particular ethical provenance. It pointed to "a set of universal principles as distinguished from reason as the faculty of connected and demonstrated argument."' 0 ' In this phase those making the appeal tended to use "rational" as often as they used "reason" meaning "reasonable." The Enlightenment appeals to "rationality" were not the same as the medieval characterization of humans as rational animals, but they retained a basis in ethical theory that both speaker and hearer took into account."° If there was (and is) an objection to reason as "a set of universal principles," it is that the Enlightenment turned human reason into a goddess and appropriated to itself the ability to judge the soundness of other kinds of moral argument." 3 And then, in what we think of as a final stage, the claim that rationality is universal ran up against the fact that one person's rationality does not work the same way another person's does. 3 This late historical development turned into a morality of autonomy, which, as we perceive it, says that no person's reason can be coherently labelled superior to any other person's reason. And that, in moral terms, means that no one need listen to anyone else: every person is her own tyrant. That position was, we guess, interesting for a while for ethics, but it seems to have run its course-as is signalled by the popular academic label "post modem.1) 105 2. Subjective has had a similar, modem fate. To call something subjective, in the early nineteenth century, was to claim no more than that it existed "in the mind of him who judges," that is, that it was unreachable for ethical discourse." This sometimes had a positive cast, as in reflection on the human dignity of a person even as she makes a subjective argument. Since then, however, "subjective" has been commonly used in contrast aspects of people and of life which are to be exalted.").
Professor Macntyre also contributed to modem ethical reflection the neo-Aristotelian notion of the "practice," an activity-related small community for moral formation and reflection. See ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 187-94 (2d ed. 1984). In discussing the consequent issue of whether a person thinking ethically, within a practice, can manage without resorting to the perspective of persons not in the practice, Professor Stanley Fish said: "To think within a practice is to have one's very perception and sense of possible and appropriate action issue 'naturally'--without further reflection-from one's position as a deeply situated agent." STANLEY E. FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURAL-
LY 386-87 (1989).
That is, what is rational in ethics includes the intuitive, but only, we suppose, when the context of a particular practice is described or invoked.
105. The term "postmoder" is not used much among careful thinkers. It seems to have become trendy first in critical studies of art and architecture. In speculative thought, it has come to signal rejection of ideas associated with the Enlightenment. Michael Weingrad says it "includes semiotic, deconstructive, psychoanalytical, and post-structural anthropological approaches to the analysis of art, politics, and culture. 106. WILLIAMS, supra note 93, at 311.
with the nobler "objective"; to claim "that there can be a kind of art or kind of thinking in which the active subject is not present."'"° The objective (not subjective) is something that can be taken as factual or fair-minded "and hence reliable." 08 That something is also sometimes called rational. The result is a confusion not unlike the confusion we have attempted to describe for the A-word: "Subjective and objective, we might say, need to be thought through-in the language rather than within any particular school-every time we wish to use [either] word."''°3
. Standard. The early use of "standard" was to claim "an authoritative example of correctness." Royal Standard is an example, as is the "standard foot."" 0 Then the word becomes a boast, as in "Standard Oil Company," where the word is "a term of assessment or grading ... a concept of graded progress within a hierarchy.""' Raymond Williams says, "It is often impossible, in these uses, to disagree with some assertion of standards without appearing to disagree with the very idea of quality. ' ' " He gives the familiar example of "university standards," when the claim (boast) goes so far as "a generalizing version of the essence of a civilization."" The modem development has been that the word merely signals disagreement, without implying an agreed-upon source for resolution of the disagreement, as in "standard wage" or "standard of living."" 4 4. Civilized. Early use here pointed to a process rather than a judgment-as in the legal distinction between a criminal case and a civil case." By the late sixteenth century it had come to be a cultural boast as well-as when Thomas Hooker speaks of a "civil society" or Boswell compares civilization and barbarity 6 -and not, then, "so much a process as a state of social order and refinement." In the boasting stage-as in these examples-the word claims the superiority of "an achieved condition.
11 7 Burke refers, for instance, to "our manners, our civilization, and all the good things which are connected with manners, and with civilization."" 8 As soon as influential thinkers start boasting about civilization, the romantics begin scoffing at them and talking about "culture" instead; they invite the hearer to talk in the plural ("civilizations"), and to take his choice. 119 It was possible, that is, to argue, as Coleridge did, that "civilization," in Boswell's use of the word, is at best "a mixed good, if not far more a corrupting influence. 9 12 0 Williams concedes that the word still retains "some normative quality," but suggests that, for the most part, it is no longer useful in ethics.
Tasteful
Taste is a good word with which to end this list, since throughout its development it has suggested (take your choice) individualism, subjectivity, or autonomy. Both Cicero and Aquinas said that, in matters of taste, there is no (interesting) dispute.' But the word has had some indicative escapades along the way. In thirteenth century England it was used where a modem would say "touch" or "feel." It signalled human experience, and came a bit later to the moral claim that it is a good thing to have ennobling experiences.' Addison spoke, in the eighteenth century, of "the fine taste of writing," for example." z In the nineteenth century it was, in Williams' phrase, "reanimated" in its pejorative sense (matters of taste being not worth taking into account). And today, in Williams' assessment, it mostly signals the consumer who for inaccessible reasons prefers one kind of beer to another. ' These examples tend to show, as our introductory exploration of the A-word does, that our moral discourse has deteriorated into [Vol. 46:781 a radical individualism that makes ethical argument virtually impossible.' But against that observation one should note that such words and uses of such words in some ways retain moral force. Lakoff and Johnson, in their study of metaphors, demonstrate that moral words can take on meaning by taking on metaphorical context.' For example, "Love is a journey, love is madness."
1 28 Even non-moral words take on moral meaning as they take on context: "gun," for example, as in "fake gun." That makes both positive claims for the object (a fake gun is, in some sense, a gun) and negative ones (a fake gun doesn't shoot). 29 Miles asked your elder author, his grandfather, as he and his brother Ezra and I came to a fallen tree in the woods, and Miles needed both hands to get over the log, to "hold my gun for a minute." Ezra said, "That is not a gun; it is a stick that looks like a gun." Miles said, "I know that, but sometimes I like to call it a gun that looks like a stick."
The point in this passing reflection on metaphors is that metaphorical context for words, even words that in direct signification have lost whatever moral force they once had, if any, may revive moral quality and even turn listless words into comprehensive moral judgment. Which could be to say that, focusing on notions such as "situation" and "what fits"--that is, on context-makes it more rather than less possible to make moral sense out of whatever is for the moment trendy in popular discourse. And that brings us to a second possibility for "appropriate."
B. Maybe "Appropriate" Means Something in Ethics
In a new study of the teachings of Jesus on wealth, Sondra Ely Wheeler, a teacher of Christian ethics, takes issue with the late Reinhold Niebuhr, one of the twentieth century masters of her trade.' She does it by invoking a method of ethical reason- Jesus commands his disciples 'do not be anxious' and provides three arguments for the inappropriateness of anxiety. It is inadequate because it springs from an inadequate understanding of human life; it is unnecessary because God who feeds the birds will feed them; and it is ineffective because no one can add anything to his life by it ....
131.
And he said to his disciples: ... For life is more than food, and the body more than clothing. Think of the ravens, that they neither sow nor reap, they have neither storehouse nor barn, and God feeds them: by how much you surpass the birdsl ... which of you can, by worrying, add a foot to your height? Therefore, if you cannot do the smallest thing, why do you worry about the other things?
Think of the wild lilies, how they growl They do not toil nor spin; but I tell you, Solomon in all his glory was not arrayed like one of these.
But if God thus clothes the grass in a field, which exists today and tomorrow is thrown in an oven, how much more [will he clothe] you, o ones with little faithl And do not look for what you may eat and what you may drink, and do not be anxious; for all the nations of the world pursue these things, and your Father knows that you need them.
But rather, look for his kingdom, and these things will be given to you as well.
Fear no more, little flock, because it has pleased your Father to give you the kingdom.
Sell your possessions and give alms; make for yourselves purses that do not grow old, an unfailing treasure in the heavens where no thief comes near nor moth destroys;
For where your treasure is, there too your heart will be. Id. at 59-60 (Wheeler's translation from the Greek). That is, the faith Jesus enjoins is reality, is objective, reasonable, natural-and appropriate: "What unites these disparate appeals here and throughout the chapter, and makes their union intelligible, is Jesus' own 'reality perspective.'"" That is, the moral substance of the discourse is a response 1) to what is going on; and 2) to what God is doing in the world. The Kingdom has come. The accumulation of wealth is vain and useless, because you can't take it with you; and it is a waste of effort for a believer because God will take care of her. In each of these senses, and in both of them, Reinhold Niebuhr's appeal to worldly prudence is not appropriate.
Wheeler's reflection on the quoted discourse takes on Reinhold Niebuhr's "Christian realism" pointedly when she concludes one of these reflections: "To one who accepts Jesus' proclamation and is willing to shape her life by it, even the 'hard sayings' of chapter 12 are cause for rejoicing; they may be received as a liberation from anxiety, the promise of ultimate security rather than the demand for ultimate risk. 135 Wheeler uses "appropriate" where H. Richard Niebuhr would have said "responsible."' 6 The idea in religious ethics rests on a 133. WHEELER, supra note 130, at 63-64.
134.
Id. at 66.
135.
Id. at 68. Wheeler extends her analysis into the latter part of Luke's chapter 12, the parables that commend "the wise and faithful steward" and disapprove of the unfaithful servant who cheats his master.
Two things are especially noteworthy. One is that the servant's infidelity arises out of his incorrect belief about his master's return; it is his defective understanding of reality that leads to his undoing. The other is that the image of fidelity used by the parable is obedient stewardship of food and drink, suggesting that the area of obedience in question is related to the disposition of material goods.
Thus, the teaching about anxiety and possessions offered in verses 22-34 is placed by Luke between a consideration of appropriate and inappropriate objects of fear (12:1-21) and a vivid parabolic presentation of the blessing or punishment received according to one's readiness for the kingdom (12: [35] [36] [37] [38] [39] [40] [41] [42] [43] [44] [45] [46] [47] [48] instanced by obedient disposition of goods. In all of these passages, human attitudes and actions are considered as they spring from underlying beliefs, and tend toward certain ends.
Id. at 67. 136 . See I-L RICHARD NIEBUHR, THE RESPONSIBLE SELF (1963); see also ALBERT R.
19M
distinction Niebuhr borrowed from Martin Buber 37 -the difference between an "I-Thou" relation, which is "known and active in... dialectic," and an "I-It" relation, which is no relation at all because the "other" in an "I-It" encounter "is not a reflexive being. It does not know itself as known; it only knows; were it not for the accompanying I-Thou situation it would not know that it knows. It values but does not value itself or its evaluations. 13 8 From that focus, H. Richard Niebuhr (in what was originally a series of lectures, given late in life, to a group of Scots academics) contrasted three ways of talking about morals. The first, oldest, and most Greek is to evaluate morals in reference to goals and purposes in life; Niebuhr called it "man the maker" ethics; 39 modem teachers of ethics often call it "teleological" (from "telos," the Greek word for "goal"). 4 An ethical argument following this way of "doing" ethics would require a demonstration of the goal being contemplated. Aristptle is the classical example of doing ethics that way. When a "teleologist" uses the A-word, she has to include consideration of the contemplated goal or risk being incoherent (a bad word among ethicists). The second is often called "deontological," that is, moral evaluation reasoned from principles or commands; Niebuhr called it "man the citizen" ethics."' A person arguing in this way needs to demonstrate a principle or rule, such as Kant's invocation of the categorical imperative.
The third, and Niebuhr's lasting contribution to modem religious ethics, is the ethics of responsibility-or, we dare to say, with Professor Wheeler, the ethics of the appropriate. 138. NIEBUHR, supra note 136, at 72-73. Buber went, we think, even further than that-into the ontological observation that, until a human person encounters a "Thou," in addition to all of her "Its," she does not even come into existence. See BUBER, supra note 137, at 120-22. Niebuhr's formulation, 1) "to whom am I responsible?" and 2) "in what community?" Niebuhr and his followers refer to it as the ethics of the fitting, the moral question being, "In this situation, what is appropriate?" That last was Wheeler's word, but Niebuhr would likely agree that it can be used here:
[P]urposiveness seeks to answer the question: "What shall I do?" by raising as prior the question: "What is my goal, ideal, or telos?" Deontology tries to answer the moral query by asking, first of all: "What is the law and what is the first law of my life?" Responsibility, however, proceeds in every moment of decision and choice to inquire, "What is going on?" If we use value terms then the differences among the three approaches may be indicated by the terms, the good, the right, and the fitting;, for teleology is concerned always with the highest good to which it subordinates the right; consistent deontology is concerned with the right, no matter what may happen to our goods; but for the ethics of responsibility the fitting action, the one that fits into a total interaction as response and as anticipation of further response, is alone conducive to the good and alone is right.' 4 '
Thus, H. Richard Niebuhr resolved the tension between the ethics of virtue and the ethics of duty by suggesting a third category that puts context at the center of ethical discussion. The word "appropriate" can be a way to signal ethical (and legal) orientation, but it won't work unless it comes with the context on which the theory, and therefore the discussion, depend.
C. Maybe "Appropriate" Means Something in Law
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, via its Chief Judge Posner, used the A-word correctly in an emerging area of Title VII law. Recently, the courts have struggled with whether Title VII contemplates a cause of action for same-sex sexual harassment.'" Expressing his views on the dilemma, Judge Posner noted that "[s]exual harassment of women by men is the most common kind, but we do not mean to exclude the possibility that sexual harassment of men by women, or men by other men, or women by other women would not also be actionable in appropriate cases." 1 4 The context in which Judge Posner made this observation indicates that he thinks "appropriate" describes the legality of the conduct itself. He wrote:
The concept of sexual harassment is designed to protect working women from the kind of male attentions that can make the workplace hellish for women.... Drawing the line is not always easy. On one side lie sexual assaults; other physical contact, whether amorous or hostile, for which there is no consent express or implied; uninvited sexual solicitations; intimidating words or acts; obscene language or gestures; pornographic pictures.... On the other side lies the occasional vulgar banter, tinged with sexual innuendo, of coarse or boorish workers.'"
Acknowledging the difficulty in distinguishing inappropriate (illegal) behavior from appropriate (legal though perhaps, to some, offensive) behavior, Judge Posner continued:
We spoke in [an earlier case] of "the line that separates the merely vulgar and mildly offensive from the deeply offensive and sexually harassing." ... It is not a bright line, obviously, this line between a merely unpleasant working environment on the one hand and a hostile or deeply repugnant one on the other; and when it is uncertain on which side the defendant's conduct lies, the jury's verdict, whether for or against the defendant, cannot be set aside in absence of trial error. Our case is not within the area of uncertainty. [The alleged harasser], whatever his qualities as a sales manager, is not a man of refinement; but neither is he a sexual harasser. He never touched the plaintiff. He did not invite her, explicitly or by implication, to have sex with him, or to go out on a date with him. He made no threats. He did not expose himself, or show her dirty pictures. He never said anything to her that could not be repeated on primetime television. 47 So it seems that in the Seventh Circuit, following Baskerville, inappropriate behavior is that which is actionable, and appropriate behavior is that which is not.
In a recent hostile work environment decision by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, yet another court followed Judge 4 8 Judge Kennedy reviewed a jury's verdict and award of compensatory and punitive damages to a plaintiff who had been subjected to numerous workplace comments about women's anatomy. The magistrate judge found that the evidence "revealed 'an atmosphere of a grade-school-level fascination with women's body parts combined with denigrating comments about women' which were 'not appropriate in the workplace."" 49 Citing Judge Posner's Baskerville opinion with approval, Judge Kennedy emphasized that not every type of conduct which might be offensive is actionable." s She stated: "[T]here may be times when offensive comments have an impact in the workplace, indeed constitute 'harassment,' but do not create an objectively hostile work environment. Not all workplace conduct that may be described as 'harassment' affects a 'term, condition, or privilege' of employment within the meaning of Title VII."'' Reversing the verdict, the court found that "even when construed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, the conduct does not appear to have been more than 'merely offensive,"" 2 and noted that "Title VII was 'not designed to purge the workplace of vulgarity."" 53 It remains to be seen whether other circuits will adopt Judge Posner's appropriate use of "appropriate." CONCLUSION The A-word, then, makes sense in ethics, including legal ethics, in the law, and in jurisprudence, if and when the person using it shows how it fits, is able to provide a context. Indeed, with such assistance, "appropriate" not only makes sense, becoming useful for deliberation of all kinds; it also emerges as a particularly attractive choice for those who argue from narrative, from stories, and from social science. The A-word is still hackneyed, of course, but that aesthetic objection, an appeal to taste, does not ruin it for ethics and jurisprudence."' 154. The headline writers we took to task in our opening pages might fairly claim So, then, it is appropriate to use "appropriate"--sometimes. It makes sense when the writer is carefully attending to the cast of characters, the time, the place, and the culture when she rules on what is proper. This is true when judgments about propriety are also communal moral judgments. The underlying ethical insight, as in Miss Manners' analysis of traditions that allow the throwing of food, is that offensive behavior is often not only improper but also wrong.
It does not, though, make sense to use the A-word when the writer, in addressing propriety, is attempting either to hide his moral judgment, or to lay claim to the modem ethics of radical individualism-to claim that what makes behavior moral or not is whether the actor chooses it, that the only mistake in ethics is to allow oneself to be influenced by those around her. That position, in ethics, leads nowhere.
After the deck is cleared, then, it is possible to re-read the legal examples and to conclude that, in general, judges' use of the A-word confuses more than it helps legal reasoning, except in the inevitable circumstances where sloppy legislators have used it-no doubt to avoid sounding moralistic-and thus have given judges and lawyers no choice. It is also possible-and necessary-to sort out examples of jurisprudential and moral judgment, separating those in derogation of sound, interesting, ethical argument from those that invoke enough context to be sound and interesting from either of the two perspectives we suggest are (forgive us) appropriate for ethical discussion.
that we should apply this argument for "context" to their art, which, after all, is appended to the context provided by reporters. The reporters would then be reduced to the complaint that their careful prose is desecrated when hackneyed phrases in large type are piled on top of it.
